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I. Introduction
India and the United States have had a long ongoing relation 
on matters of scientific and technical cooperation. This is not 
surprising given the high degree of association between Indian 
and US scientific and technical professionals at the academic 
level. The resulting interactions have led to a number of official 
bilateral country-to-country initiatives in joint research at 
academic institutions in both countries. The highly visible and 
successful Indo-US Joint Science and Technology Initiative 
(STI) was one such programme. At times there have been a 
few problems even in academic and research cooperation, 
especially when matters of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
began to assume importance in the US agenda. Nevertheless, 
scientific cooperation at academic level has continued without 
any major differences between the two countries.
Matters have, however, been quite different when issues of 
technology transfer between the two countries were involved. 
This is true in both commercial and non-commercial areas, 
especially after the first Indian nuclear tests conducted in 1974.
The license procedures for issuance of export licenses to India 
were tightened at the time. The time gap between license 
applications and final decisions began to get extended, with 
considerable hardship to both US exporters and Indian 
importers. By the late 70s and early 80s, the process had begun 
to reach unacceptable levels of delays and denials, especially 
with respect to computers, at both low and high levels of 
performance. The long pending application of a supercomputer 
for weather prediction, ordered by the India Meteorological 
department (IMD), was only one of the prominent cases of 
delay and procrastination by US licensing authorities.
In order to break the impasse between the US and India on 
transfer of high technology dual-use goods and technologies 
from the former to the latter, the two governments initiated 
bilateral discussions in the early 80s. This resulted in the 1984 
Indo-U S M em orandum  of U nderstand ing  (M OU) on 
technology transfer.
The MOU was negotiated by the two governments in view of 
the need to have an agreement recognizing “the importance of 
promoting commercial transactions between the two countries 
to the mutual benefit of both, without jeopardising the security 
interests of either.” '
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From the Indian perspective, the MOU’s purpose of expediting 
“the processing of those cases requiring only the assurances 
contained in the MOU”, while “limiting those cases which 
require separate case by case assurance”, was meant “to facilitate 
trade in advanced technologies.” The MOU clearly understood 
that “all the assurances will not be exercised on all items.” From 
the US perspective, which was clearly concerned at the possible 
leakage of US supplied technologies to third countries, the MOU 
had clearly stated sections which detailed the Government of 
India’s official commitment to protect US supplied technologies 
from such diversion, with joint verification, if the need for such 
a process steps were felt by both the parties. Further, the MOU 
stipulated comprehensive assurances relating “to the enhanced 
protection of particularly sensitive cases, where a validated 
license is required and where it is determined that the technology 
involved warrants such protection.”
In addition the two governments negotiated assurances given 
by the Government of India in two Side Letters containing 
higher level of assurances in respect of technologies controlled 
for nuclear nonproliferation (NP) and missile technology (MT) 
reasons. The MT Side Letter given by the Government of India 
(GOI), for example, contains a GOI undertaking that a US 
commodity will not be used to make missiles etc of more than 
300 km range and 500 kg payload capability. The MOU did 
not, however, prohibit indigenous development of ballistic 
missiles which do not have US components.
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Furthermore, the MOU did not cover all items included in the 
Commodities Control List (CCL). It was limited to
a) All items on the US CCL and all technical data controlled 
for national security reasons; and
b) All items on the US Munitions List.
The US Government was to provide the Government of India 
with the current lists and all their future updates.
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Although the implementation procedures of the MOU took 
sometime for completion of negotiations, becoming operational 
from April 1 1988, trade in high technology from US to India 
witnessed a jump from 1984 onwards. From less than $ 100 
million in 1983, it jumped to hundreds of millions of dollars 
in subsequent years. Table 1 shows trade in controlled goods 
between 1984 and 1988.^
TABLE 1
Trade in controlled goods and technologies from US to 
India (in $ Million)






B X A  data for the corresponding years; see note 5.
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In 1988, of the $2.5 billion worth of total US exports to India, 
high technology items were reported to have accounted for 
$ 870 million, over one-third of the total. (High technology 
includes items in aerospace, data processing, telecommunica­
tions, microelectronics, machine tools, scientific instruments 
etc.) Of this over three-fourths, i.e. $ 685 million, were 
controlled  goods and technologies exported under US 
individual validated licenses, i.e. under a license requiring prior 
written government approval for each export.
Indeed, recognizing India’s increasing potential as a high- 
technology partner, the US D epartm ent o f Com m erce 
established a new Export Administration Attache’s position at 
the American Embassy in India. Of the four such attache 
positions worldwide at that time, the position in India was the 
first and only one outside Europe.’
After the MOU implementation became operational in 1988, 
the Indian Government began issuing Import Certificates (IC) 
for the import from US of items that were covered by the MOU. 
However, the implementation of the MOU began to run into 
roadblocks after President Bush announced the Enhanced 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) in December 1990.
Indo-US Technology Relations
’ Steward Ballard, "Current Trends in U SL icensing o f  H i-Tech Exports: Impact 
on India", E L S O F IE X  N ew sletter, June 199!. pp. 10
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The justification for the Initiative was that the US government 
became aware that Iraq, on the eve of the Persian Gulf War, 
had enhanced its weapons of mass destruction capabihty by 
obtaining imported goods that were exempt from licensing 
requirem ents. EPCI led to the im position of chem ical, 
biological, and missile end use and end user-based controls 
that were similar to the nuclear end use and end user-based 
controls already in effect. The EAR”* requires that exporters 
obtain a license for export of an item, even if one is not so 
normally required, if the exporter knows or is informed by 
BXA^ that the export will be used in nuclear, chemical, or 
biological weapons or missiles or facilities engaged in such 
activities. US persons are also restricted from activities in 
support of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or missile- 
related projects. Although the US Government stated that these 
regulations were designed to prevent exports that could make 
a material contribution to proliferation projects of concern and 
were not intended to affect legitimate commercial trade, in 
practice this had a major impact on Indo-US bilateral trade in 
high technology products.
EPCI began as a US unilateral control, but with US leadership, 
a large majority of its nonproliferation regime partners have 
also incorporated so-called “catch-all” export controls. At
G. Balachandran '
E A R , Export A dm inistration Regulation; See A nnexure 1.1 
’ B X A ; Bureau o f  Export Administration'. S ee  A nnexure l . l
present, virtually all of the NSG* and M TCR’ member 
countries have some form of catch-all controls.
In addition, notwithstanding the provisions of the MOU which 
stipulated that the two Governments were to have regular 
consultations “to enable the Government of India to convey 
its views”, a number of changes were made by the US 
Government which effectively reduced the role and importance 
of the MOU in Indo-US high technology transactions. When 
the MOU was negotiated in 1984, the US CCL had 220 entries 
of which 154 were controlled for national security reasons 
(either alone or in conjunction with other reasons, bringing
70.0 percent of the entries in the CCL under the purview of 
the MOU. Through various modifications and additions in the 
CCL, the number of entries had by 1993 increased to 416 while 
the number of entries controlled for national security reasons 
was only 162 accounting for less than 40 percent of CCL 
entries.
F u rther rap id  advances in com puter technology  had 
progressively resulted in accelerated relaxation of controls on 
computers. For example, in 1984 computers with a performance 
capability of 6 MTOPS (million theoretical operation) were 
considered to be super computers. Technological advances
Indo-US Technology Relations
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 ̂ M TCR; M issile  tech n ology  C ontrol R egim e, S ee  Chapter II
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since then have resulted in a rapid relaxation of controls on 
computers, and the limits for unlicensed exports to civilian 
end-users and end-uses have been raised in rapid stages. The 
last revision, effective January 19, 2001, raised the limit to
85,000 MTOPS!
For all these reasons the 90s saw a gradual erosion in the 
importance of the MOU which was reflected in the steady drop 
in the value of ICs issued by the Government of India as well 
as of licenses approved for India. Table 2 gives the figures for 
the value of export licenses issued by the USG, the share of 
computers in that value and the value of ICs issued by the 
Government of India.
In recent years much of the ICs issued by the Government of 
India have been to the Ministry of Defence for munitions items. 
The value of export licenses for munitions items are not 
included in the value of export licenses in Table 2, which only 
gives the value of licenses issued by the Department of 
Commerce. The IC values, however, are in respect of MOU 
items i.e. NS controlled items in the USCCL and munitions 
items in the USML.
One further clarification is necessary in respect of the data in 
Table 2. The values of export licenses since 1997 need to be 
read carefully. During 1997 and 1998, the major elements 
consisted of three items;
G. Balachandran
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i) EAR99 items, i.e. items, that are not listed separately in 
the US CCL and which normally do not require licenses. 
These amounted to $ 28.1 M in 1997; $26.1 M in 1998 
and $482.5 M in 1999.** This increase in 1999 was 
because many entities in India that imported these items 
were listed as requiring individual licenses as a result of 
the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). In 
addition, because of the May 98 sanctions imposed by 
the US following the Indian nuclear tests, the number of 
Indian entities in the entity list was enlarged to more than 
200. As a result the value of EAR licenses was nearly $ 
500 million in 1999;
ii) Items controlled for chemical weapons reasons. Many 
common chem icals are classified as precursors or 
intermediate chemicals for chemical weapons and hence 
need licenses. The MOU does not cover items controlled 
for chemical weapon reasons; and
iii) Software for information security, primarily encryption 
items. These accounted for $ 60.4 M in 1997 and $ 62.9 





Value of US export licenses (including computer licenses) and 
of ICs issued by the Government of India. ($ Million)
Year Value of US export licenses for India ICs issued








1990 221 131.0 134.1
1991 166.4 70.8 100.2
1992 70.1 24.8 100.1
1993 63.0 24.6 56.5
1994 66.1 3.42 23.3
1995 30.7 2.67 32.4
1996 43.1 1.54 26.9
1997 150.4 0.13 37.4
1998 149.4 1.65 39.2
1999 757.0
2000 164.0
Apart from the problems associated with the working of the 
1984 MOU, the USG had also seemed to have taken a policy 
decision to freeze technology transfers to India. In May 1992, 
the USG imposed missile proliferation sanctions on the Indian 
Space Research Organisation (ISRO) pursuant to Sec. 73 of 
the Arms Export Control Act. These sanctions included the 
prohibition of any license for exports to ISRO. This was 
notwithstanding the Side Letter containing higher level
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assurances about the nonuse of US supplied components in 
any of the Indian missile programmes.
In a similar manner, the US refused to export even minor 
components for the safe running of the Tarapur Atomic Power 
Station (TAPS) even though such exports were permitted by 
the US Atomic Energy Act.
Thus by the mid 90s, Indo-US relations on matters of high 
technology dual-use goods and technologies had almost ceased 
to exist and continued to be an irritant in the advancement of 
bilateral relations.
Indo-US Technolog]/ Relations
II. May 1998 Sanctions
When India conducted its second round of nuclear tests in May 
1998, it automatically resulted in the application of US 
sanctions on India on account of Sec. 102 of the Arms Export 
Control Act (AECA).’ The sanctions were broad in scope (Sec. 
102 (b)(2)(A)-(G)).'° For our analysis the relevant ones were 
the following:
1 Sec. 102 (b)(2)(B); The United States Government shall 
terminate
** B X A  Foreign P olicy  Report 1999.
Presidential determ ination 9 8 -2 2  o f  M ay 13, 1998. Federal Register: fr20m y98- 
123. A nnexure II. 1
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(i) sales to that country under this Act of any defense articles, 
defense services, or design and construction services, and
(ii) licenses for the export to that country of any item on the 
United States Munitions List.
2. Sec, 102 (b)(2)(G): The authorities of section 6 of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit exports 
to that country of specific goods and technology (excluding 
food and other agricultural commodities), except that such 
prohibition shall not apply to any transaction subject to the 
reporting requirements of title V of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (relating to congressional oversight of 
intelligence activities)
For the purposes of this Act the term “goods and 
technologies” means
A) nuclear materials and equipment and sensitive nuclear 
technology (as such terms are defined in section 4 of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978), all export 
items designated by the President pursuant to section 
309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 
and all technical assistance under section 57 b. of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and
B) in the case of exports from a country other than the 
United States, any goods or technology that, if exported 
from the United States, would be goods and technology 
described in subparagraph (A).
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On June 18, 1998, the Department of Commerce announced 
certa in  sanctions on India and Pakistan , as well as 
supplementary measures to enhance the sanctions in line with 
the Presidential directive. Subsequently on November 19, 1998, 
the D epartm ent of C om m erce am ended the Export 
A dm inistration  R egulations (EAR) to codify the June 
an n o u n cem en t.” It also added Sec. 742.16 to the EAR 
codifying a license review policy, implemented in practice in 
May, of denial for the export and reexport of items controlled 
for nuclear proliferation (NP) and missile technology (MT) 
reasons to all end-users in India.
To supplement the sanctions of Sec. 742.16, the Department 
of Commerce added a large number of Indian government, 
parastatal and private entities determined to be involved in 
nuclear, missile or conventional military activities to the Entity 
List in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the EAR. Exports and 
reexports of all items subject to the EAR to listed government, 
parastatal and private entities were required to obtain a license. 
Exports and reexports of all items subject to the EAR having 
;i classification other than EAR99 were required to obtain a 
license to listed military entities. The United States reviewed 
license applications for the export or reexport of the restricted 
items to the listed entities with a presumption of denial.
Indo-US Technology Relations
A rm s Export Control Act (P.L. 9 0 -6 2 9 ) A nnexure 11.2
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The Entity List prepared by the Department of Commerce 
(DOC) was beyond anything contemplated in the AECA which 
had required a prohibition on exports of only “specific goods 
and technologies” , not an outright prohibition of all items ■ 
including those which formerly did not require licenses because 
of the low-technology nature of the item. EAR99 items are 
those which are of such a common nature that they do not 
merit a separate entry in the US CCL. More than 200 entities 
were listed, many of them working in areas with no connection 
to either nuclear or missile technologies (e.g. the Defence 
Institute of Psychological Research (DIPR), Defence Institute 
of Physiology and Allied Sciences (DIPAS) etc). It was 
apparent that an indiscriminate listing of entities had been made 
with little or no thought given to the areas of research of the 
entities.
In addition, in a tightening o f the sanctions, the State 
Department began to create impediments in the way of student 
visas to Indians, which was considered sufficiently serious to 
warrant the NAFSA -  National Association of Foreign Student 
Advisors -  in USA to request a meeting with State Department 
officials. Other Departments of the USG also began to obstruct 
even purely academic cooperation between Indian and US 
scientists. The Department of Energy denied requests by 
scientists at US national laboratories to visit India for 




While the US Congress did pass an act to give authority to the 
President to waive some of the sanctions, the India-Pakistan 
Relief Act, proposed by Sen. Brownback, explicitly excluded 
Sec. 102 (b)(2)(B) and (G) from the waiver authority.’̂  Thus 
the sanctions relating to technology transfer continued, which 
had far reaching effects on US licensing of goods and 
technologies to India. In the US fiscal year (FY) 1998 -  Oct. 
1 1997 to Sept. 30 1998, the DOC received 1008 applications 
for exports to India. Of these 427 were for items classified as 
EAR99 -  otherwise not requiring a license but submitted due 
to the new requirements. In FY 1999, the US approved 651 
licenses fo r exports to India and denied  995 license 
applications. Many of the license applications -  43 percent of 
the approved ones and 79 percent of the denied ones -  were 
for EAR99 products. Denial of licenses for exports to India 
constituted the bulk of US global denials.'^ In 1999, for 
example, while India accounted for only 2228 of the 12876 
applications processed by DOC, denials of licenses for export 
to India formed the bulk of total US denials -  1011 out of a 
total 1169. India had the lowest rate of approvals amongst the 
group of countries targeted by the US: China, Cuba, North 
Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Syria etc.
Indo-US Technology Relations
India-Pakistan S anctions and other m easures. Federal Register: fr l9 n o 9 8 -1 8 . 
'^India-Pakistan R e lie f  A ct, 1998. Section  101(a) T itle  IX o f  Public Law 105- 
277 . R ep ealed  O ct. 25 ,1999 .
B X A  Foreign P o licy  Report 1999.
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Considering the pre-sanction volume of licensed trade between 
India and the US, the loss felt by India as a result of the 
sanctions of Sec. 102 (b)(2)(G) was not very severe.
However, the sanctions as a result of Sec. 102(b)(2)(B), i.e. 
denial of licenses for items on the USML, did have some 
impact. In particular some of the more important and immediate 
cases of impact on this account were the following;
1) The non-return of the Flight Control System for the Light 
Combat A ircraft (LCA) which was sent to USA for 
evaluation and which has been impounded by the US 
Government under Section 102(b)(2)(B)(i).
2) The denial of licenses for export of engines for the ALH, 
(Advanced Light H elicopters), thereby delaying the 
production of this helicopter;
3) Denial of export licenses to both US and certain European 
firms for export of weapon locating radars to the Indian 
army -  an item urgently needed by them for a long period 
but especially so during the Kargil operations; and
4) Grounding of the navy’s fleet of Seaking helicopters as a 
result of the suspension of product support by the British 
firm under orders from the US State Department.
In each of these cases, there was some significant impact on 
one or more of India’s programmes of national security concern.
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It was not, however, that the effects of the sanctions were felt 
only in India. The US International Trade Commission 
published a study on the impact of sanctions in September 
1 9 9 9  14 jjj. summary findings were:
1) Effect on US Industry. According to statements received 
by the Com m ission amongst im porters there was an 
increasing perception of US com panies as unreliable 
suppliers. Also the companies most affected by the sanctions 
were those involved in the sale of industrial nniachinery, 
transportation, and electronic products.
2) Impact on India. Based on the analysis of economic and 
trade data, the commission concluded that the sanctions had 
a relatively minimal overall impact on India’s economy. 
Incidentally this was in line with some of the analysis of 
the sanctions that had been done in India -  both prior to, 
and after, the tests and the imposition of sanctions.'^
The duration of the India-Pakistan Relief Act was only for 
one year and the sanctions waiver expired in October 1999.
Indo-US Technology Relations
O verview  and A n alysis o f  the Econom ic Impact o f  U S Sanctions with Respect 
to India and P akistan , In vestiga tion  N o . 3 3 2 -4 0 6 , U S International Trade 
C om m ission , Septem ber 1999.
“The inescapab le con clu sion , therefore, is that India need not worry about 
any n egative fallout on its econ om y due to the US and its a llie s ’ reactions and 
counter-m easures in case  it decides to renew its nuclear testing,” G.Balachandran, 
An E valuation o f  the e ffe c ts  o f  US sanctions against India, May 1996, And 
“T he foregoin g  d iscu ssion  su ggests that the sanctions im posed  by the US and 
others, though nationally  irksom e, are unlikely to have any serious effect on our 
eco n o m ic  d ev e lo p m en t," , G ,BaIachandran and T ,C ,A , Srin ivasa Raghavan, 
Sanctions: Indo-U S Perspectives, Asian Institute o f  Tran.sport D evelopm ent, N ew  
D elh i, June 1998
19
The US Congress in the meantime passed in October 1999 a 
new sanctions waiver, as part of the Defense Appropriations 
Act, 2000. This differed from the earlier sanctions waiver in 
three major respects. First it was not a time bound one; 
secondly, it did not exclude Sec. 102(b)(2)(B) and (G) from 
the waiver authority. However, it did stipulate that these could 
be waived only if the President certified that the application 
of sanctions would not be in the national security interests of 
the United States; and finally the Congress expressed the 
sentiment that the broad application of export controls to the 
very large number of entities is inconsistent with the specific 
national security interests of the United States and that this 
control list required refinement.'^
President Clinton waived part of the sanctions, under this 
authority, on Oct. 27 1999, but chose not to remove technology 
rela ted  sa n c tio n s .’’ The Departm ent of Commerce did, 
however, remove some 51 Indian entities from the list of over 
200 organisations that had been named in November 1998.'* 
In addition it relaxed slightly the conditions for issuance of 
licenses for EAR99 items. Later on in June 2000, it removed
G. Balachandran
T itle IX, Departm ent o f  D efen se  A pproprialiuons Act 2 0 0 0  (P.L. 106-79), 
A nnexure 11.3
Presidenti-al determ ination 2 000-4  o f  O ct.27, 1999. Federal Register; fr08no99- 
143.
B X A  EAR Entity List: Rem oval o f  Entities etc. Federal Register; frl7m r00-6. 
B X A  EAR Entity List; revisions to the Entity List. Federal Register; fr26jy00-10.
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two more entities from the Entity List while at the same time 
it added one more entity.''’
These changes had some minor impact. The denial rate of 
licenses for India fell from 63.7 percent in 1999 to 34 percent 
in 2000. This was, however, primarily due to the relaxation of 
rules governing licenses for EAR99 items which in the normal 
course of circumstances would not have in any case required 
licenses. The two components of sanctions with respect to 
technology transfer. Sec. 102(b)(2)(B) and (G), continued to 
remain in place. President Clinton did, however, exercise in a 
very limited way his authority to waive sanctions under Sec. 
102(b)(2)(B) by allowing the transfer of only certain specified 
US-origin helicopter parts from UK to India, i.e. in respect of 
the Seaking helicopters.^”
It was only on September 22, 2001 that President Bush finally 
exercised his waiver authority and removed all remaining 
sanctions on India including Sec. 102(b)(2)(B) and (G).^' The 
Department of Commerce followed this action by drastically 
reducing the number of Indian Entities still left in the Entity 
List.“
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'̂’Presidential D eterm ination 2001-11 o f  Jan 19 2001. Federal R egister. frO lfeO l- 
87.
^'Presidential D eterm ination  2 0 0 1 -2 8  o f  Septem ber 22, 2001 . Federal R egister  
fr02 o c0 1 -1 0 9
“̂B X A  India-Pakistan: L ifting o f  sanctions, R em oval o f  Indian Entities and 
R ev is io n  in L icen se  R ev iew  policy. Federal R egister. frO locO l-
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What was the effect of the sanctions in respect of technology 
relations? As discussed earlier, by the time the May 1998 
sanctions were imposed such relations had already sunk to low 
levels. Therefore, in practical terms they did not add anything 
more to India’s problems except for three things;
1) It made it difficult and cumbersome to procure ordinary 
goods and technologies which would not have in the normal 
course of events required any license. It increased 
paperwork.
2) It made it necessary for Indian importers to second-source 
some of their requirements from countries other than the 
US.
3) As already discussed there was some impact in respect of 
items on the USML.
What effect will the removal of sanctions have on Indo-US 
technology relations? It is too early to say. After all, removal 
of sanctions only takes the relation to pre-May 1998 status. 
And as has been already discussed, that state was anyway pretty 
low. Therefore, removal of sanctions per se would not improve 
the environment. Removal of sanctions, though a necessary 
condition for improvement; is not a sufficient one unless it is 




111. Technology Export Control Regimes________________
The United States is not alone in controlling export of high 
technology dual-use goods and technology. There exist a 
number of supplier-controlled regimes -  a sort of cartel so to 
speak -  that coordinate the exports of such items through 
informal multilateral groupings. Of these the following are the 
four prominent ones:
1) Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
2) Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
3) The Australia Group
4) The Wassanaar Group.
1. Nuclear Suppliers Group
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the NPT Exporters 
Committee (Zangger Committee) are two arrangements that 
administer multilateral nuclear export controls. The Zangger 
Committee was formed soon after the NPT came into force in 
order to interpret Art. III.2 of the NPT and consisted of NPT 
signatories. It came into being in 1970.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group had its origin at a meeting, as 
a result of the Indian nuclear tests in 1974, of seven supplier 
countries -  Canada, France, UK, FRG. Japan, USA and USSR 
-  in order to look afresh into nuclear exports.^'* After a series
liido-US Technology Relations
T he N uclcar Suppliers Group: Its origins, R ole ind A cii\ ities. IAEA INFCIRCV 
539 . Sept. 97.
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of meetings in London in 1975, as a result of which the group 
was initially referred to as the London Group, these countries 
reached an agreement, published by the IAEA in 1978, on a 
set of guidelines for nuclear transfer. These guidelines are 
commonly referred to as the NSG Guidelines.
The NSG Guidelines were similar to the Zangger committee 
guidelines, in that they required IAEA safeguards only on items 
supplied. Fullscope safeguards were favoured by some of the 
participants, but others would not support the proposal so 
nothing was achieved. Once the Guidelines were published 
the adherents to the Guidelines did not meet for the next 13 
years. One reason for this could be the fact that the NSG had 
originally been convened as a reaction to the Indian tests of 
1974, and having met and formed a new group they did not 
feel any compulsion to meet thereafter because the Indian 
nuclear explosions programme also did not develop any further.
However, the Gulf War changed all that. Once again the Group 
was confronted with a state that had an ongoing nuclear weapon 
programme, which although in its initial stages, had been 
developed with the import of dual-use items. The Group began 
to meet in a formal way, with a meeting in Hague in 1991 
followed by another in Warsaw in 1992. The Hague meeting 
resulted in certain major initiatives towards the restructuring
G. Balachandran
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24
of the NSG working. First, it resulted in the establishment of 
a Working Group to examine the feasibility of a dual-use export 
control arrangement. Second, parallel with the establishment 
of the Dual-use Group, efforts were made to tighten the export 
of nuclear items. Also, while those attending the early meetings 
were still referred to as ‘adherents’ and not ‘members’, by 
1993 the concept of membership got recognized. Today 
“adherent” is the status of a country that has informed the 
Director General of IAEA of its intention to abide by the 
Guidelines, and asks that he inform the Agency members of 
this decision. Membership is a status that can only be attained 
by a consensus of the existing members of the group.
By 1993 a number of changes had taken place in the working 
of the NSG. The group formally incorporated full scope IAEA 
safeguards on “all source and special fissionable materials in 
its (i.e. the recipient country’s) current and future peaceful 
ac tiv ities’’.̂  ̂ However, the new Guidelines relaxed these 
requirements partially by making them not applicable to 
“agreements or contracts drawn on or prior to April 3, 1992.” '̂’ 
In addition the new Guidelines allowed for transfers without 
a fullscope safeguards agreement “only in exceptional cases 
when they are deemed essential for the safe operation of 
existing facilities and if safeguards are applied to those
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facilities.”-̂  According to knowledgeable sources, a common
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understanding on what constitutes “exceptional cases” was 
agreed upon at the 1994 Plenary in Madrid according to which 
“exceptional cases are generally understood as those when a 
transfer of a trigger list item is deemed to be essential in order 
to prevent or correct a radiological hazard posing a significant 
danger to public health and safety and which cannot be 
realistically met by other means.”-̂
In addition the group formally announced their guidelines for the 
transfer of dual-use items;̂ ** the NSG arrangement covering their 
export is markedly different from that of the Zangger Committee. 
As dual-use items cannot be defined as EDP (Especially Designed 
or Prepared) equipment, they fall outside the Zangger Committee’s 
mandate. Further, the Zangger requirements do not include full- 
scope safeguards on all source and special fissile material in the 
recipient country. Notwithstanding the.se differences, there is close 
cooperation between the NSG and the Zangger Committee. There 
is substantial overlap between the memberships of the two groups. 
China is a member of the Zangger Committee and not of the 
NSG. On the other hand Belarus, Brazil, Cyprus, Latvia and New 
Zealand arc members of the NSG but not of the Zangger 
Committee.
27 Sec. 4 (c) IN FC lR C /254/R ev. 1/Part 1/M od. 1, July 1993.
CarUon E. Thorne, A G uide  lo N u c le a r  E xpovt C on tro ls, 2001. pp. 78  
N SG  G uidelines for Transfers o f  Nuclear-Related D ual-use equipment material 
and related technology, IAEA IN FC IR C /254/R ev. 1/Part2. July 1992
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Membership of the NSG has grown over the years, and 
currently the NSG has 39 members. There is no formal 
membership procedure for NSG. New members are admitted 
by a consensus of the group as a whole. Membership is attained 
through a two-step process: a country becomes a Subscribing 
Government to the Dual-Use Arrangement by a consensus 
decision to invite a country into the Dual-Use Arrangement 
and by an exchange of diplomatic notes with other Subscribing 
Governments and becomes a participant in the NSG Plenary 
by a consensus decision by all current NSG members. Countries 
that are not members can attend the NSG meetings as 
observers.
The NSG has had some impact on the Indian nuclear program 
for civil end-uses. Certain NSG members initially questioned 
the contract between the former USSR and India for the supply 
of reactors for the Koodankulum Nuclear Power Project as being 
contrary to the NSG Guidelines, since India does not have any 
full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA. Russia, the 
successor state to the USSR, defended the agreement as it 
predated April 3, 1992 -  the cutoff date in the NSG Guidelines. 
However, there may be problems in extending the project beyond 
the two reactors originally contracted for in the agreement.
On the other hand, France expressed its inability to continue 
supplying fuel to Tarapur once the new Guidelines came into 
force even though the agreement for fuel supply predated April
27
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3, 1992. Recently when Russia agreed to supply fuel to Tarapur, 
the US objected to the sale in the NSG meetings as being 
contrary to the exceptions allowed under Sec. 4(b) of the NSG 
Guidelines.
Currently, because of NSG Guidelines, India will find it 
difficult to find partners or collaborators for its nuclear power 
programmes, both in terms of technology and finance.
2. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), similar to 
the NSG, was established in 1987 as an informal association 
of countries, which seek to coordinate their national export 
licensing efforts, aimed at preventing proliferation of missiles 
and missile technologies. Like the NSG, the MTCR too is based 
on adherence by its members to common export policy 
guidelines, the MTCR Guidelines. Again, like the NSG, the 
MTCR also has a common list of controlled items, listed in 
two groups or categories. Category I items, which require 
greatest restraints, include complete rocket systems and 
unmanned air vehicle systems. There is a strong presumption 
of denials of such items. Category II items invite lesser 
restrictions. Nevertheless, recipients are expected to give strong 
end-user certificates attesting to non-diversion of items to 




The MTCR too revised their guidelines after some time, like 
the NSG. Originally the items controlled were for delivery 
systems capable of delivering a payload larger than 500 kg for 
a range of over 300 km. A later revision included all delivery 
systems of range greater than 300 km with no minimum 
payload weight -  to take care of biological and chemical 
weapon payloads.
The most striking difference between the NSG (and the Zangger 
Committee) and the MTCR is the fact that the former have 
behind them at least some form of an international treaty, that 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) as 
the basis for the grouping, whereas the MTCR has no such 
international legal basis. There is no international treaty 
banning the development and possession of missiles. It is, 
therefore, left to each country to interpret the conditions of 
transfer in the light of their own domestic legislation and 
practices.
Although the MTCR does not have an observer category, 
countries can become adherents to the MTCR by observing 
the MTCR Guidelines on transfer of missiles and related 
technology. However, unlike the NSG, there is no formal 
approach as such to becoming an adherent. Members are free 
to choose their own definition of an adherent. The US, for 
instance, defines an “MTCR adherent” as “a country that 
participates in the MTCR or that, pursuant to an international
29
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understanding to which the United States is a party, controls 
MTCR equipment or technology in accordance with the criteria 
and standards set forth in the MTCR.’”° There are currently 
33 members in the MTCR.
MTCR Guidelines have had an impact on the Indian space 
programme. In May 1992, the United States imposed missile 
p ro lifera tion  sanctions on the Indian Space Research 
Organisation (ISRO), pursuant to the Sec.73 (a) of the Arms 
Export Control Act.’’ These sanctions prohibited granting any 
license for exports to ISRO or entering into contracts with it. 
The sanctions applied to ISRO and all of its subdivisions and 
subunits. These sanctions were imposed in response to the Indo- 
Russian agreement for the transfer of cryogenic engines and 
their technology from Russia to India. Russia was also 
sanctioned -  in their case the space agency Glavkosmos -  for 
the transfer. As a result of the sanctions the Russians withdrew 
from the contract for technology transfer, but instead chose to 
augment the number of cryogenic engines that were to be 
supplied. In addition individual programmes of the ISRO, such 
as the PSLV and GSLV continue to be under extended scrutiny 
under the EPCI of the US export controls. It is true that unlike 
the NSG Guidelines there is far less cooperation between 
M TCR m em bers in sharing com mon denial lists, but
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nevertheless MTCR has had and continues to have some 
negative impact on the Indian space programme.
3. The Australia Group (AG)
The Australia Group (AG) is another informal group of 
countries concerned with control of technologies relevant for 
the production of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) -  in 
this case chemical and biological weapons. The group came 
into existence in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war, when a 
special in . estigatory mission sent by the UN Secretary General 
to Iran found that chemical weapons had been used in that 
war.^  ̂ A number of countries imposed licensing measures on 
the export of a number of chemicals used in the manufacture 
o f chem ical w eapons. The m easures im posed by the 
governments concerned, however, were not uniform in either 
scope or application. It also became apparent that attempts 
were being made to circumvent the measures.
This led Australia to propose, in April 1985, that the countries 
which had introduced licensing for exports might meet in order 
to examine the scope for harmonising the measures taken 
individually and for enhancing cooperation amongst them on 
this issue. Accordingly the first meeting of what subsequently
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became known as the Australia Group took place in Brussels 
in June 1985. Like the NSG and the MTCR, the AG too is an 
informal arrangement. Participants do not undertake any 
legally binding obligations. Measures agreed to at meetings of 
the Group are applied on a national basis, although all 
participants agree that they will be more effective if similar 
measures are introduced by all potential exporters of relevant 
chemicals, biological agents and equipment and by countries 
that may be involved in transshipment of such goods as well.
The group holds regular meetings at which issues concerning 
the operation of export controls is reviewed. In addition the 
meetings also review the list of chemical weapon precursors, 
human, animal and plant agents whose exports need to be 
controlled as also the dual-use facilities and equipment that 
can be used to produce these items.
With the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CW C) and the setting up of the O rganisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, the 
work of the AG has become redundant to some extent, 
especially with respect to the states party to the CWC. However 
the AG still operates a cartel, with much to be desired by way 
of transparency of its operations. Although it was affirmed in 
1992 that the AG countries would “undertake to review, in the 
light of the implementation of the Convention, i.e. the CWC, 
the measures that they (i.e. the AG) take to prevent the spread
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of chemical substances and equipment for purposes contrary 
to the objectives of the Convention, with the aim of removing 
such measures for the benefit of State parties to the Convention 
acting in full compliance with their obligations under the 
Convention,” in practice they have a long way to go. The AG 
still operates as a restrictive cartel -  a denial regime so to 
speak -  rather than as a group concerned with controlling 
proliferation. The list of items controlled by the AG is larger 
than that defined by the CWC.
However, the impact on India of the AG and its common export 
licensing policies is very little or nil. The US CCL, for example, 
controls the export of precursors/intermediate chemicals for 
chemical warfare as also human pathogens and toxins. Indeed 
export licenses for such items form the biggest component of 
US export licenses for India. During much of the 90s they 
formed the single largest element, in value terms, of export 
licenses for India; $ 19 million out of a total of $43 million 
in 1996; $ 33 million/$ 150 million in 1997 and $30 million/ 
$ 149 million in 1998. At the same time there have been 
virtually no denials of export licenses for such items during 
this period. Between 1991-95, for example, there was only 
one rejection of an export license for such an item worth $65. 
In the year 2000, the latest year for such data is available, no 
applications for export of such items were denied.
Indo-US Technology Relations
33
4. The Wassenaar Arrangement (W Ap  
Formally the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) is the latest export 
control regime. Its roots however go back to the former 
COCOM regime, which was considered to be anomalous after 
the end of the Cold War. The then COCOM members felt the 
need to establish a new arrangement to deal with the spread 
of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. 
Accordingly, the then 17 members of COCOM met in The 
Hague in November 1993 to terminate COCOM and establish 
a new multilateral arrangement. This decision was confirmed 
at a high level meeting in Wassenaar, Netherlands in March 
1994. COCOM ceased to exist on March 31, 1994 although 
participating States agreed to continue the use of the COCOM 
control lists as a basis for global export controls on a national 
level until the new arrangement could be established. Working 
Groups were formed to flesh out the details of such a new 
arrangement. Also a number of other countries, not members 
of COCOM, were included in the negotiations. Finally an 
agreement to establish the “Wassenaar Arrangement” was 
reached in December 1995 at Wassenaar. In the meantime, the 
Russian Federation, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the 
Slovak Republic -  all former targets of COCOM -  were 
welcomed as participating states. After further negotiations -  
and the inclusion of new members -  a consensus on the
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arrangement was reached in July 1996 and the first Plenary 
Meeting of the 33 founding members took place where the 
Wassenaar Secretariat was located in December 1996.
Although the WA is formally open on a global and non- 
discriminatory basis to prospective adherents that comply with 
the agreed criteria, its current membership still remains at 33, 
the original number of founding members in 1996. Admission 
of new members requires the consensus of all members. The 
Arrangement does not have an observer category.
The WA maintains two lists: a Munitions List and a Dual-Use 
List. These lists are reviewed periodically to take into account 
technological advances or other changes in circumstances. The 
Dual-Use List, also called the Basic List (Tier 1), has two 
nested annexes of Sensitive (Tier 2) and Very Sensitive items 
(Tier 2 sub-set). For items on the Sensitive List, information 
exchange requirements are more extensive (see below). For 
items on the Very Sensitive List (e.g., stealth technology 
materials, high-powered computers, equipment related to 
submarine detection, advanced radar, advanced jet engine 
technology), participating states are to exercise “extreme 
vigilance” with respect to exports.
Although member states enforce the WA export controls 
through their national policies to ensure that transfers of arms, 
dual-use goods and technologies do not contribute to the
35
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development or enhancement of military capabilities that 
undermine the goals of the Wassenaar Arrangement and are 
not diverted to support such capabilities, the decision to transfer 
or deny any items is the sole responsibility of each participating 
state. The WA’s stated policy is not to impede bona fide  civil 
transactions and is directed at exports to non-members only.
Nevertheless WA does have certain information exchange 
requirements amongst participating states. The Arrangement’s 
specific information exchange requirements involve semi­
annual notifications of arms transfers, currently covering seven 
categories derived from the UN Register of Conventional Arms 
(including model and type information). Sensitive List dual- 
use transfers and denials of Basic List dual-use transfers. 
Members are also required to report within 30-60 days any 
denials of Sensitive List items. Any member that undercuts 
such denials (i.e., export the denied item to the same end- 
user) within three years of the denial must report the issuance 
of the export license within 30-60 days.
There is no evidence to suggest that the WA has had any effect 
on India’s trade in high technology dual-use and munitions 
items, apart from the problems associated with the application 




Except for NSG and MTCR, which have had a direct impact 
on some of India’s technological programmes, the other two 
have not had any direct or material impact. All these four 
regimes share a number of characteristics: (i) they are informal 
with a closed membership; (ii) they have a high degree of 
commonality in membership'*^; (iii) while all of them profess 
that their aim is not to disrupt trade or act against peaceful 
programmes of other nations, in practice they are aimed at 
precisely such programmes; and finally, (iv) they lack any 
transparency  in the ir operations. W hile all these are 
objectionable features that are not conducive to any meaningful 
international efforts, it is also true that they are more or less 
here to stay. The aim of India should be to reorient these groups, 
if and when India decides to join them and they agree to Indian 
membership. At this point of time neither party has seriously 
considered such a move.
IV. Future Indo-US Technology Relations_______________
In the final years of Clinton’s second term, relations between 
the US and India began to thaw, culminating in the successful 
visit of President Clinton to India. A number of agreements 




between the two heads of state, the setting up of a number of 
bilateral commissions etc. As already mentioned, in the last 
days of his presidency President Clinton exercised -  albeit in 
a limited manner -  the sanction waiver on issue of licenses 
for Munitions List items when he cleared the return of the 
SeaKing helicopter parts that had been impounded in UK.
The new adm inistration under President Bush has been 
con tinu ing  w ith the p rocess started  by the prev ious 
administration. In fact, it had expressed its desire to accelerate 
the process of reorientation. Even though the events of 
September 11, 2001 have drawn immediate attention of the 
US administration -  as indeed the whole world -  it is also 
necessary to look beyond the immediate need to respond to 
the fight against terrorism and examine the options to advance 
US-India common interests and programmes.
While Indo-US relations encompass a whole range of issues 
-  economic, political and technological -  we shall concentrate 
here on the science and technology aspects of the bilateral 
relation. It is worthwhile mentioning here that the recent move 
by the Bush administration to remove all remaining 1998 
sanctions is a step in the right direction, and will go some way 
towards the freeing of restraints that were in place in bilateral 
high-technology trade. In US FY 2001 (Oct. 1, 2000-Sept.30, 
2001), while the BXA processed around 11000 applications 
globally -  of which Indian applications accounted for about
38
G. Balachandrnn
1000, denials of export licenses to India numbered 244 out of 
a global denial -  inclusive of India -  of 398. With the 
announced changes in BXA regulations, this rate of denial of 
export licenses for India is expected to come down.
So where do we go from here? Some of the steps that can be 
taken are given below. It must be stressed that many of these 
issues have long been on the bilateral agenda and are not issues 
that can be solved without much preparation and hard work 
on both sides. They are however amenable to solutions that 
address the concerns of both the coun tries  w ithout 
compromising the interests of either.
4.1 The 1984 Indo-US MOU
The 1984 Indo-US MOU has been discussed in Section I. As 
already m entioned, the coverage of the MOU has been 
drastically reduced over time, but it did address in a positive 
and comprehensive manner the interests and concerns of both 
the countries. It was meant to encourage technology transfer 
by recognizing the centrality of trade in technology transfers. 
It addressed Indian concerns about delays in the processing of 
Indian applications by having a single point issue of Import 
Certificates (IC) by the Government of India. It made such 
transfers routine and automatic in the majority of cases -  items 
that were controlled for national security reasons in the CCL 
and items listed in the Munitions List. It took care of US 
concerns about diversion to both third parties and to domestic
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programmes of concern. It allowed for joint investigations by 
both the governments in cases where there was concern about 
diversion to third parties. It took care of US concerns about 
transfer of sensitive technologies by allowing for additional 
assurances by the Government of India. It took care of US 
apprehensions about diversion of US technologies to nuclear 
and missile development programmes with side letters from 
India assuring no such diversion. The effects were felt almost 
immediately after the MOU was concluded.
There is a need to revive the original spirit of the 1984 MOU, 
but modifications are necessary. These include:
i) Expansion of the scope of the MOU to include all items 
on the CCL of the ERA. This would include, therefore, 
not only NS items but also items controlled for nuclear 
proliferation (NP) and missile technology (MT) reasons. 
This would not be out of place especially after India has 
already given side letters for assuring the US about the 
nondiversion of such items for projects of concern.
ii) To take care of sensitive technologies, India and the US 
can negotiate an “India Green Line” analogous to the 
“China Green Line” . In case of the “China Green Line”, 
the general licensing policy was to approve applications, 
except for those items that would make a direct and 
significant contribution to electronic and anti-submarine
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warfare, intelligence gathering, power projection and air 
superiority. Such applications were to receive extended 
review or denial. In addition it provided that items might 
be approved even though they may contribute to Chinese 
military development, or the end-user or end-use may be 
military. The proposed “India Green Line” could be along 
similar lines although the list will have to be negotiated 
by the two countries taking into account both Indian needs 
and US concerns.
4.2 Anti-Terrorism Technologies
Terrorism will continue to be a problem in the international 
arena for sometime -  maybe even for a long time. Appropriate 
technologies need to be developed for fighting international 
terrorism. India and the US can jointly and selectively work on 
the development of appropriate anti-terrorism technologies. India 
has been combating terrorism for more than a decade and the 
two countries should begin identifying areas of technology 
cooperation. Recently, the US Government requested proposals 
for development of appropriate technologies to combat terrorism, 
in all for nearly 40 end uses,’'’ This is in addition to technologies 
which India may require from USA and which are currently 
controlled for Anti Terrorism reasons.
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4.3 Defence Technology Cooperation
There already exists a mechanism for defence technology 
cooperation. With the removal of sanctions it should be possible 
to develop some joint defence technology programmes. India 
should consider the signing of a G eneral Security of 
Information Agreement with the USA for this purpose. Such 
an agreem ent betw een the two countries w ill ensure 
confidentiality of information and data that may be exchanged 
between the two countries. However, Gol will need to study 
the clauses of such an agreement in detail.
4.4 Multilateral Technology Regimes
Although the US is currently preoccupied with the September 
terrorism and its aftermath, non-proliferation will continue to 
remain high on the US agenda, probably even more so in view 
of the worries about terrorists getting their hands on WMD. 
As discussed earlier, of the four Technology control regimes 
only the NSG and the MTCR have had any effect on India’s 
programmes. An export control system is already in place in 
India; and it is not out of line with the controls imposed by 
these regimes. There are thus a number options that need to 
be examined in this context.
i) NSG
It would appear that there might be some options with respect 
to India joining the NSG. One approach has been outlined in
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a separate note.’'’ In addition India could consider the merits 
and drawbacks of becoming an observer at NSG meetings. 
The NSG (for which a provision exists). This would give an 
opportunity to both India and the NSG members to interact 
without any firm commitment from either side. This may have 
some merit. Since the US is currently the Chairman of the 
NSG and India can discuss this with US both in a bilateral 
and a multilateral context.
i i )  M T C R
Cooperation in space technologies for India’s peaceful space 
programmes has been often identified as one of the potential 
areas of technological cooperation. However, US laws and export 
regulations act as a brake to progress in this area. This has 
adverse effects in two ways. First, it prevents direct US 
cooperation with India on space technology. Second, it prevents 
others from cooperating with India on space technologies because 
of the fear of inviting sanction from US under its own laws.^^
One way this problem could be addressed is by India being 
considered as an adherent to MTCR. Under US laws, transfers 
from third parties to a country that is an MTCR adherent do 
not invite sanctions.’* And according to Sec. 74 (a) (3) AECA,
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“the term ‘MTCR adherent’ means a country that participates 
in the MTCR or that, pursuant to an international understanding 
to which the United States is a party, controls MTCR 
technology and equipment in accordance with the criteria and 
standards set forth in the MTCR;” further, according to Sec. 
74 (b) of the AECA, “For the purposes of subsection (a)(3), 
as it relates to any international understanding concluded with 
the United States after January 1, 2000, the term ‘international 
understanding’ means
(1) any specific agreement by a country not to export, transfer 
or otherwise engage in the trade of any MTCR equipment or 
technology that contributes to the acquisition, design, 
development, or production of missiles in a country that is not 
an MTCR adherent and would be, if it were of United States- 
origin, equipment or technology, subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States under this Act; . .
This involves only a bilateral agreement with the US. In the 
light of the Side Letters that have already been given by the 
Government of India and the-export control laws that have 
been passed by India in respect of sensitive technologies, it 
may be possible for India and the US to conclude such an 
“international understanding” without too much difficulty. This 




The above discussion points to some of the options that are 
available for consideration to both the countries, India and the 






Control of US Exports
The US government has had a system to control exports 
through much of their history. In modern times, this aspect of 
export controls took a new meaning and role with the onset 
of the cold war in the late 40s. The US relied principally on 
two legislative acts to enforce such export controls: The Export 
Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 for the control of exports 
of dual-use goods and technologies, and the Arms Export 
Control Act (AECA) for the export of defence articles and 
defence services.
The Export Administration Regulation (EAR), administered 
by the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) of the US 
Department of Commerce, implements the provisions of the 
EAA, BXA also maintains a list, as required under the EAA, 
consisting of the goods and technologies subject to export 
controls under EAA. This list is known as the Commodity 
Control List (CCL).
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 
administered by the Department of State, implements the 
provisions of the AECA. The Office of Defence Trade Controls 
in the Department of State maintains a list of items designated 
by the President as defence articles and services for the 
purposes of the implementation of the AECA. This list is
4 6
commonly referred to as the United States Munitions List 
(USML).
The EAA expired in August 1994. Since then the control of 
exports of dual-use items has been carried out through a 
com bination o f em ergency statu tory  au thority  -  the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (lEEPA), 
executive orders and regulations. The latest such Executive 
Order was issued by President Bush on August 17, 2001 
extending the provisions of the Export Administration Act of 
1979 from August 2001.
An Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) -  each 
number being a set of digits and a letter, identifies items listed 
in the CCL. The reasons for control of these items -  identified 
by a digit -  are the following:
• 0: National Security reasons (including Dual Use and 
International Munitions List) and items on the NSG Dual 
Use Annex and Trigger List;
• 1: Missile Technology reasons;
• 2: Nuclear Nonproliferation reasons;
• 3; Chemical and Biological Weapons reasons; and
• 9: Anti-terrorism, Crime Control, Regional Stability, Short 
Supply, UN sanctions etc.
Since reasons for control are not mutually exclusive, items 
may be controlled for more than one reason i.e. for example
4 7
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for both national security  reasons as well as nuclear 
nonproliferation reasons.
The number of items in the CCL and the reasons for their 
control vary over time depending on reviews carried out by 
the BXA in consultation with other agencies of the government.
The reach of the EAR is broad. Except for a few limited items, 
listed separately below, these include:
1) All items in the United States, including in the US Foreign 
Trade Zones or moving in transit through the United States 
from one country to another;
2) All US origin items wherever located;
3) US orig in  parts, com ponents, m ateria ls  or other 
commodities incorporated abroad into foreign made 
products, US origin software, and US origin technology 
com m ingled w ith foreign technology in quantities 
exceeding de minimis levels; and
4) Certain foreign-m ade direct products of US origin, 
technology or software.
The exceptions are:
1) Items that are exclusively controlled for export by other 
agencies of the US Government such as:
a) Department of State for items in the USML;
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b) O ffice of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the 
Department of Treasury which implements broad controls 
and embargo transactions with certain foreign countries;
c) US Nuclear Regulatory Commission which controls 
export and re-export of commodities related to nuclear 
reactor vessels;
d) Department of Energy for the export and re-export of 
technology related to production of special nuclear 
materials;
e) Patent and Trademarks Office for export of technologies; 
in the form  o f paten t app lica tion , am endm ent, 
modification or supplement, that are subject to the EAR; 
and
2) Certain publicly available technology or software that is 
already published, resu lts of fundam ental research, 
educational materials and phonographs, printed books, 
newspapers, periodicals etc.
Items subject to EAR but not listed under a separate ECCN 
in the CCL are given the classification EAR99. Such items, 
even though subject to export controls, do not in practice 
require licenses unless specially notifies. These are usually 




The CCL, in addition to listing of items, also includes for each 
item, along with its ECCN, the reasons for its control and the 
license requirements and exceptions. It is the responsibility of 
each exporter to verify whether or not an export requires a 
license and act accordingly. The EAR is a voluminous 
document, which sets out in detail the procedures to be 
followed by an exporter in executing an export order.
The ITAR is similar to the EAR but with its application 
restricted to items on the USML. Otherwise the procedures 
and practices in exporting an item are more or less identical.
G. Balnchandran
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. Annexure II. 1
Imposition of sanctions on India, May 1998,
[Federal Register: May 20, 1998 (Volume 63, Number 97)] 
[Presidential Documents]
[Page 27665]






Presidential Determination No. 98-22 of May 13, 1998
Sanctions Against India for Detonation of a 
Nuclear Explosive Device
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
In accordance with section 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export 
Control Act, I hereby determine that India, a non-nuclear- 
weapon state, detonated a nuclear explosive device on May 
11, 1998. The relevant agencies and instrumentalities of the 
United States Government are hereby directed to take the
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necessary actions to impose the sanctions described in section 
102(b)(2) of that Act.
You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit this 
determination to the appropriate committees of the 




Washington, May 13, 1998.
[FR Doc. 98-13601 
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Annexure II.2
Sec. 102 Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90 - 629)^’
(b) PROHIBITIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES 
INVOLVED IN TRA N SFER OR USE OF NUCLEAR 
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES; EXCEPTIONS;
PROCEDURES APPLICABLE. -  (1) Except as provided in 
paragrapiis (4), (5), and (6), in the event that the President 
determines that any country, after the effective date of part B 
of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 -
(A) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon state a nuclear explosive 
device,
(B) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and either -
(i) receives a nuclear explosive device, or
(ii) detonates a nuclear explosive device,
(C) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon state any design 
information or component that is determined by the President 
to be important to, and known by the transferring country to
22  u s e .  2 7 9 9 a a - l .  Popularly referred to as the G lenn am endm ent. Sim ilar  
language w as orig inally  enacted as sec. 6 7 0  o f  the Foreign A ssistan ce A ct o f  
1961, and cod ified  at 22 U SC . 2429a , by Sec. 12 o f  Public Law  9 5 -9 2  (91 
Stat, 620); am ended and restated by sec. 737 (c) o f  the International Security  
and D evelop m en t C ooperation A ct o f  1981 (Public Law 9 7 -1 1 3 ; 95 Stat. 1562); 
and further am ended by sec. 1204 o f  the International Security and D evelopm ent 
C ooperation  A ct o f  1985 (Public Law  9 9 -8 3 ;  99  Stat. 277). Sec. 6 7 0  (and sec. 
6 6 9 )  w ere repealed by sec. 826(b ) o f  the N uclear Proliferation Prevention Act 
o f  1994  (title VIII o f  the Foreign R elations A uthorization Act; Public Law 1 OS- 
236; 108 Stat. 519 ), after section  826(a) o f  that A ct enacted tw o new  sections  
into the Arm s Export Control A ct (secs , 101 and 102; at 22 U SC . 2799aa  and 
2 7 9 9 a a - l )  to state nuclear nonproliferation controls.
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be intended by the recipient state for use in the development 
or manufacture of any nuclear explosive device, or 
(D) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and seeks and receives any 
design information or component which is determined by the 
President to be important to, and intended by the recipient 
state for use in, the development or manufacture of any nuclear 
explosive device, then the President shall forthwith report in 
writing his determination to the Congress and shall forthwith 
impose the sanctions described in paragraph (2) against that 
country.
(2) The sanctions referred to in paragraph (1) are as follows;
(A) The United States Government shall terminate assistance 
to that country under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
except for humanitarian assistance or food or other agricultural 
commodities.
(B) The United States Government shall terminate—
(i) sales to that country under this Act of any defense 
articles, defense services, or design and construction 
services, and
(ii) licenses for the export to that country of any item on 
the United States Munitions List.
(C) The United States Government shall terminate all foreign 
military financing for that country under this Act.
(D) The United States Government shall deny to that country 
any credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance by 
any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States
54
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Government, except that the sanction of this subparagraph shall 
not apply -
(i) to any transaction subject to the reporting requirements 
of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (relating 
to congressional oversight of intelligence activities),
(ii) to medicines, medical equipment, and humanitarian 
assistance, or
(iii) to any credit, credit guarantee, or financial assistance 
provided by the Department of Agriculture to support the 
purchase of food or other agricultural commodity.
(E) The United States Government shall oppose, in accordance 
with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act 
(22 u s e .  262d), the extension of any loan or financial or 
technical assistance to that country by any international 
financial institution.
(F) The United States Government shall prohibit any United 
States bank from making any loan or providing any credit to 
the government of that country, except for loans or credits for 
the purpose o f pu rchasing  food or o ther agricu ltura l 
commodities, which includes fertilizer.
(G) The authorities of section 6 of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit exports to that country 
of specific goods and technology (excluding food and other 
agricultural commodities), except that such prohibition shall 
not apply to any transac tion  subject to the reporting  
requirements of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 
(relating to congressional oversight of intelligence activities).
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Annexure II.3
Title IX of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 
2000 (Public Law 106-79; 113 Stat. 1283) repealed the India- 
Pakistan Relief Act, effective October 21, 1999. In its place, 
title IX of that Act provided the following;
“TITLE IX
“WAIVER OF CERTAIN SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIA 
AND PAKISTAN
“SEC. 9001. (a) WAIVER AUTHORITY -  Except as provided 
in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the President may 
waive, with respect to India and Pakistan, the application of 
any sanction contained in section 101 or 102 of the Arms 
Export Control Act (22 USC. 2799aa or 22 USC. 2799aa-l), 
section 2(b)(4) of the Export Import Bank Act of 1945 (12 
USC. 635(b)(4)), or section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961, as amended, (22 USC. 2375(e)).
“ (b) EXCEPTION -  The authority to waive the application of 
a sanction or prohibition (or portion thereof) under subsection
(a) shall not apply with respect to a sanction or prohibition 
contained in subparagraph (B), (C), or (G) of section 102(b)(2) 
of the Arms Export Control Act, unless the President 
determines, and so certifies to the Congress, that the application 
of the restriction would not be in the national security interests 
of the United States.
“ (c) TERMINATAION OF WAIVER -  The President may not 
exercise the authority of subsection (a), and any waiver
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previously issued under subsection (a) shall cease to apply, 
with respect to India or Pakistan, if that country detonates a 
nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of 
this Act or otherwise takes such action which would cause the 
President to report pursuant to section 102(b)(1) of the Arms 
Export Control Act.
“ (d) TARGETED SANCTIONS -  
“ (1) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS -
“ (A) it is the sense of the Congress that the broad application 
of export controls to nearly 300 Indian and Pakistani entities 
is inconsistent with the specific national security interests of 
the United States and that this control list requires refinement; 
and
“ (B) export controls should be applied only to those Indian 
and P ak istan i en titie s  that m ake d irec t and m aterial 
contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile pro­
grams and only to those items that can contribute to such 
programmes.
“ (2) REPORTING REQUIREMENT -  Not later than 60 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
subm it both a classified  and unclassified report to the 
appropriate congressional committees listing those Indian and 
Pakistani entities whose activities contribute to missile 
programmes or weapons of mass destruction programmes. 
“ (e) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION -  The issuance of 
a license for export of a defense article, defense service, or 
technology under the authority of this section shall be subject
5 7
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to the same requirements as are applicable to the export of 
items described in section 36(c) of the Arms Ex-port Control 
Act (22 u s e .  2776(c)), including the transmittal of information 
and the application of congressional review procedures.
“ (f) REPEAL -  The India-Pakistan Relief Act (title IX of the 
A gricu ltu re , Rural D evelopm ent, Food and Drug 
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 
1999, as contained in section 101(a) of Public Law 105-277) 




Multilateral Export Control Regimes
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Annexure IV 
India and the global system of nuclear 
non-proliferation initiatives
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the NPT Exporters 
Com m ittee (Zangger Com m ittee) are the two principal 
multilateral arrangements that control nuclear exports. With 
the exception of a few countries, these two arrangements 
contain within them almost all the countries that have an 
established nuclear industry. The three main outsiders are India, 
Israel and Pakistan.
The exclusion of India from these two arrangements has had 
some effect on the Indian civilian nuclear industry, especially 
with respect to nuclear power. India’s ever-growing demand 
for power makes it imperative that it consider nuclear power 
as a serious option to satisfy its power needs. India and China 
will account for the major portion of addition to the global 
nuclear power industry in the coming years.
For the past 25 years or more, India’s nuclear power industry 
has relied almost exclusively on indigenous development to 
satisfy its needs. W hile Ind ia’s exclusion from the two 
multilateral regimes will not stop its nuclear industry from 
growing, it will almost certainly slow it.
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This brief note explores options througii which the international 
community and India can come to terms with each other 
w ithout sacrific ing  their p rincipal needs. That of the 
international community is to halt the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and their technologies without impeding trade, and 
that of India to join the international community in non­
proliferation efforts without sacrificing its national security 
need for maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent capability.
It is very unlikely that India will be able to join the Zangger 
C om m ittee, because o f its inability  to jo in  the NPT: 
membership in the NPT is a prerequisite for membership to 
the Zangger Committee.
Why can India not join the NPT? India has nuclear weapons 
an3 means to retain them as part of its strategic requirements. 
NPT formally has only two types of member states: nuclear 
weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. They have been 
defined strictly in the treaty itself. India does not qualify as a 
nuclear weapon state. The treaty has to be amended if India 
is to be included as a nuclear weapon state. Amendment would 
require the approval of (a) a majority of all the Parties to the 
treaty, growing to 187 by early 2000; (b) all the NPT-defined 
nuclear weapon states; and (c) all the NPT members who are 
on the Board of Governors of IAEA. Amendment to the treaty, 
therefore, is a formidable task. On the other hand there is no 
scope for India to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.
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Therefore, India’s membership in the Zangger Committee is 
extremely unlikely.
What about the Nuclear Suppliers Group? Ironically it may be 
easier for India to join the NSG, an arrangement that was born 
as a reaction against the India nuclear tests of 1974. The reason 
is that there are a number of crucial differences between the 
Zangger and NSG guidelines.
First, the NSG does not define its membership in the same 
way as NPT does. As far as membership goes there is no 
distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. 
The distinction between the two arises only in respect of the 
conditions under which nuclear trade may take place.
Second, unlike the NPT, and hence the Zangger Committee, 
the NSG does not have formal definition of a nuclear-weapon 
state although the term non-nuclear-weapon state is frequently 
used in its documents. Of the various members of the NSG 
only the United States has formally, as a part of its legislative 
requirements, adopted the NPT definition of a nuclear weapon 
State. According to NSG principles, its members are free to 
interpret the NSG guidelines in line with their domestic 




Third, the NPT requires non-nuclear weapon states not to 
acquire nuclear explosive devices. Such states have to forsake 
manufacture or possession of nuclear explosive devices as a 
binding international commitment. The NSG does not make 
any such binding demands on the non-nuclear weapon states 
that engage in nuclear trade.
Coming now to the case of India, it can be argued that India 
can agree to NSG membership without sacrificing any of its 
national security requirements, and at the same time, NSG can 
accommodate Indian membership without sacrificing any of 
the non-proliferation goals of the NSG. Indeed Indian 
membership in NSG will enhance the effectiveness of nuclear 
and dual-use technology controls globally as India is possibly 
the only country outside NPT with full nuclear-fuel cycle 
activities that are not part of any international control regime.
Let us first start from the NSG perspective. NSG Guidelines 
contain two parts. Part I for nuclear transfers and Part II for 
transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, 
software and related technology.
NSG Part I
The fundamental principle for Part I transfer is (Art. 2): 
“Suppliers should authorize transfer of items or related 
technology identified in the trigger list only upon formal
6 4
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governmental assurances from recipients explicitly excluding 
uses which would result in any nuclear explosive device.”
In addition the guidelines suggest that:
“Suppliers should authorize transfer of items or related 
technology identified in the trigger list only when they are 
satisfied that the transfers would not contribute to the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons or other explosive activities.” 
(Art. 11)
To achieve these objectives it is required that 
“Suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related 
technology to a non-nuclear weapon State only when the 
receiving State has brought into force an agreement with the 
IAEA requiring the application of safeguards on all source and 
special fissionable material in its current and future peaceful 
activities.” (Art. 4(a))
This is supplemented by the suggestion that
“Suppliers reserve the right to apply additional conditions of
supply as a matter of national policy.” (Art 4(e))
NSG Part II
The objective of Part II is to avert the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons by controlling the “transfer of certain equipment, 
materials, software and related technology that could make a
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major contribution to a “nuclear explosive activity” or an 
“Unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity.” To that end the 
Guidelines require that
“Suppliers should not authorize transfers of equipment, 
materials, software or related technology identified in the 
Annex:
•  for use in a non-nuclear-weapon state in a nuclear explosive 
activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle facility, or
•  in general, when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion 
to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to the 
objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.” 
(Art 2 of NSG Guidelines Part II)
The Guidelines also suggest that
“In the process of determining that the transfer will not pose 
any unacceptable risk of diversion, in accordance with the basic 
principle and to meet the objectives of the Guidelines, the 
supplier should obtain, before authorizing the transfer and in 
a manner consistent with its national laws and practices, the 
following;
(a) a statement from the end-user specifying the uses and end- 
use locations of the proposed transfer; and
(b) an assurance explicitly stating that the proposed transfer 
or any replica thereof will not be used in any nuclear explosive 
activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity.” (Art V)
G. Balachandran
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There are a number of ways in which India can be integrated 
into the global non-proliferation control arrangements to the 
benefit of both India and the world community.
First, India could declare a list of ‘peaceful’ nuclear activities 
which it can offer to place under IAEA safeguards. Those 
facilities that are known and are not declared to be peaceful 
would be considered -  or could be declared -  to be ‘military’.
What is the difference between this and the NPT requirement, 
in case of non-nuclear weapon States, that “safeguards 
required...shall be applied on all source and special fissionable 
material in all peaceful activities.”?
In the case of NPT, a non-nuclear weapon State has to give an 
undertaking that it will neither manufacture nor otherwise 
acquire a nuclear explosive device. Therefore the only non­
peaceful nuclear activity involving fissionable material that is 
perm itted to be outside safeguards is nuclear submarine 
activities. Therefore, a non-nuclear weapon State party to NPT 
cannot declare any activity other than nuclear submarine 
activities to be non-peaceful. The NSG, on the other hand, 
does not require any commitment from any member to forsake 
nuclear weapons. Therefore, it should be permissible for a state 
not party to NPT to declare, under NSG Guidelines, part of its 
nuclear-fuel cycle activities as peaceful and others as military 
without breaching any international commitment. The NSG
67
Indo-US Technology Relations
members for their part can “apply additional conditions of 
supply as a matter of national policy” to ensure that the supplies 
made do not in any manner contribute to proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.
India shofild not have any difficulty in accepting additional 
conditions to ensure that such transfers do not contribute to 
the Indian nuclear weapons programme. As a matter of fact, 
India had given such a nuclear side letter, as an addition to the 
1984 Indo-US MOU on technology transfer, to ensure 
transparency and to assure the US of its intention not to use 
any such transfer in any manner inconsistent with the supplier’s 
(in this the case the USA) domestic laws and non-proliferation 
principles.
Such an arrangement would be a compromise between the 
positions of those NSG members who are non-proliferation 
fundamentalists and that of India which is now a nuclear 
weapon state and may like to be recognized formally aj; such. 
By allowing transfers to India, after it has made a distinction 
between ‘peaceful’ and ‘non-peaceful’ activities within its 
territory but accepted IAEA safeguards on all ‘peaceful’ 
activities as a voluntary gesture, the non-proliferation 
fundamentalists would have the satisfaction of not bestowing 
on India any formal recognition as a nuclear-weapon state and 
at the same time have the satisfaction of bringing under control 
a substantial portion  of today ’s global production of
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unsafeguarded fissile material. India, for its part, would have 
the benefit of nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes without 
having to place all of its nuclear activities under IAEA 
safeguards and also getting recognition of its military nuclear 
activities.
Alternately, some members of the NSG can recognize that India 
is no more a non-nuclear weapon state -  within the terms of 
their domestic legislation if any -  without contravening their 
NSG commitment since NSG has not formally adopted the 
NPT definition of a nuclear-weapon state. In that case 
provisions of Art 4 of NSG Guidelines Part I would not apply 
and the voluntary placing of its peaceful nuclear activities under 
IAEA safeguards by India could be construed as a positive 
contribution to nuclear non-proliferation as nuclear transfers 
for peaceful purposes will not contribute to proliferation of 
nuclear weapons thus satisfying the requirements of the “Non­
proliferation Principle” of A rt.ll.
NOTE:
It would be worthwhile to study the implications of the MOU 
that was reached at the time of the formulation of NSG 
Guidelines Part 2. This MOU uses the term “Subscribing 
Governments”, which is not used in the Guidelines themselves. 
An analysis of NSG publications would suggest that the 
following is representative of the NSG arrangement:
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A country can become an adherent to the NSG Guidelines by 
informing the Director General of the IAEA of its intention to 
abide by either the NSG Guidelines and asks that he inform 
the Agency members of this decision. Nothing further is 
required either of the state concerned or the NSG members. 
The status of an “adherent” is independent of the views of the 
members of NSG.
Till 1993, membership of the NSG was not a recognized 
concept. Till then all the adherents attended the NSG meetings. 
However since 1993 only the members are allowed to attend 
meetings. Membership now is a status that can be attained 
only by a consensus of the ex isting  m em bers of the 
arrangement.
The term “Subscribing Government” is unique to the Dual- 
Use arrangement. According to the MOU a Subscribing 
Government is one that
(a) exchanged notes of acceptance of the MOU and both the 
Guidelines (Part 2) and the Annex on 3 April 1992; or
(b) subsequently, upon the unanimous consent of all existing 
Subscribing Governments, becomes a Subscribing Government 
based on an exchange of notes of acceptance of this MOU and 




Thus membership in the NSG seems to be a two-step process. 
A country becomes a Subscribing Government to the Dual- 
Use Arrangement, by a consensus decision to invite a country 
into the Dual-Use Arrangement and by an exchange of 
diplomatic notes with other Subscribing Governments. A 
country becomes a participant in the NSG Plenary by a 
consensus decision by all current NSG members.
Does this m ean that India can becom e a Subscribing 
Government to the Dual-Use Arrangement first and then 
become a member of NSG? How difficult would it be to 
become a Subscribing Government? Are there any precedents 
to such a move? All these require some serious study.
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